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ABSTRACT. We empirically show on a sample of 270
unquoted, private equity backed companies that the share-
holder structure of private companies impacts the quality of
their publicly available accounting information. More precisely,
companies in which private equity (PE) investors have a high
equity stake produce lower quality accounting information than
companies in which PE investors have a low equity stake, after
controlling for factors like company size and age. We explain
our ﬁndings by arguing that PE investors with low equity stakes
have a higher need for high quality accounting information
whereas PE investors with high equity stakes have other means
to closely monitor their portfolio companies.
KEY WORDS: ﬁnancial reporting quality; governance;
ownership structure; private equity.
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1. Introduction
It is well documented that getting private equity
1
(PE) has a profound impact on the way entre-
preneurial companies operate. PE investors are
active ﬁnancial intermediaries, which operate
in an environment characterized by extensive
information asymmetries, leading to high adv-
erse selection and moral hazard risks (Bottazzi
et al., 2004; Brander et al., 2002). Further, the
illiquidity and non-diversiﬁability of PE ﬁrms
investments create high idiosyncratic and mar-
ket risks. As a consequence, PE investors are
active ﬁnancial intermediaries, allowing them to
reduce these risks. As such, they fulﬁll two
distinct roles: one of monitoring the progress of
the portfolio company and one of supporting
the portfolio company, thereby aﬀecting the
corporate governance systems in-place (Cowling,
2003; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2004) and creat-
ing value (Manigart and Sapienza, 1999).
In this paper we highlight the impact of PE
investor governance on one speciﬁc aspect of the
functioning and professionalization of their port-
folio companies. More speciﬁcally, we explore the
relationship between the ownership stake of a PE
investor and the quality of the accounting infor-
mation made public by its portfolio company,
hereby extending the ﬁnding that PE investors
positively aﬀect the accounting information dis-
semination of their portfolio companies (Beuse-
linck et al., 2004; Davila and Foster, 2005; Katz,
2006). We provide evidence that the extent of PE
ownership in a company signiﬁcantly inﬂuences
thequalityofitsﬁnancialaccounts.Weexplainthis
ﬁnding from basic economic theory, where high
ﬁnancial reporting quality is a natural outcome of
PE monitoring and governance but also depends
on the proportional ownership of PE investors.
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ous stakeholders such as banks, credit rating
agencies, employees, customers and suppliers all
rely partly on publicly available accounting
information for their decision-making. By
improving the quality of the accounting infor-
mation in their portfolio companies, PE inves-
tors thus not only serve their own interests but
they provide valuable services for other stake-
holders as well. This might partially explain why
PE investors have a positive certifying eﬀect on
their portfolio companies beyond the mere
provision of ﬁnancing (Gompers and Lerner,
1999). Despite the economic importance of this
topic, only a few studies have so far looked at
the properties and value relevance of ﬁnancial
reporting in PE backed ﬁrms (Armstrong et al.,
2006; Beuselinck et al., 2004; Hand, 2005). The
present paper adds to this stream of research by
acknowledging that not only the mere fact of
having a PE investor as shareholder inﬂuences
the quality of the accounting information, but
that also the importance of its ownership stake
matters.
The entrepreneur – PE investor relationship
almost inevitably results in the need for intensive
monitoring by the investor and tight governance
structures. Since both parties are interrelated by
a principal – agent relationship where personal
incentives of the agent (entrepreneur) may
diverge from those of the principal (PE investor),
PE investors typically try to solve the agency
problem via contracts and intensive monitoring
of the entrepreneurial activities (Kaplan and
Stro ¨ mberg, 2004). The European Venture Cap-
ital and Private Equity Association (EVCA)
Book of Guidelines (chapter 4, p. 40) states that
‘‘monitoring should allow the [investment] man-
ager to conﬁrm that the investment is progressing
in accordance with the relevant business plan and
should provide suﬃcient information to identify
any failures to meet targets or milestones and to
formulate remedial plans where necessary.’’
Monitoring often takes place through PE
representatives in the board of directors where
the progress of the venture is regularly assessed
(Kaplan and Stro ¨ mberg, 2001). In addition, PE
investors have informal contacts with the
entrepreneur and key managers (Sapienza et al.,
1996) and they require structured interim
information between board meetings (Beuse-
linck et al., 2006). Finally, they accelerate the
introduction of a professionally developed,
controllable ﬁnancial reporting and internal
control system in their portfolio companies
(Davila and Foster, 2005; Mitchell et al., 1995).
Next to monitoring their portfolio compa-
nies, PE investors contribute to their progress in
various ways: they give strategic, business and
ﬁnancial advice (Sapienza et al., 1996), they are
instrumental in the recruitment of top manage-
ment team members (Hellmann and Puri, 2002),
and they act as a source of professional and
industry contacts (Sapienza et al., 1996).
Althoughourunderstandingofthemonitoring
and value adding role of PE investors is
increasing rapidly, the way these actions aﬀect
the corporate governance practices of their
portfolio ﬁrms still remains largely unexplored.
Moreover, there is hardly any evidence whether
and how this change in corporate governance
practices aﬀects corporate decision-making and
information disclosure of PE portfolio ﬁrms. A
recent stream of research tackles this important
research question by analyzing the interaction
between PE presence and the reliability and
value-relevance of ﬁnancial statements. Hand
(2005) illustrates that PE presence positively
impact the value relevance of ﬁnancial state-
ments of PE-backed companies, especially when
they are more mature. Beuselinck et al. (2004)
document that the publicly reported ﬁnancial
information of unlisted Belgian PE backed ﬁrms
is of a higher quality than that of similar non-PE
backed ﬁrms. Katz (2006) ﬁnds similar results
for a sample of unlisted PE backed US ﬁrms
with proportions of public debt. The positive
impact of PE investors on the quality of the
ﬁnancial reporting of their portfolio companies
is explained by the active monitoring and
governance eﬀorts of PE investors and the
ensuing professionalization of their portfolio
ﬁrms.
This paper contributes to the novel literature
on the interaction between PE ownership and
the quality of external ﬁnancial reporting in
unquoted companies. More speciﬁcally, we
examine the relation between PE share owner-
ship and the quality of the ﬁnancial reporting of
their portfolio companies. We argue and
262 C. Beuselinck and S. Manigartempirically show on a sample of 270 unquoted
PE backed Belgian companies that the quality of
the publicly reported accounting information of
entrepreneurial companies depends on the
equity percentage held by the PE investor.
2 We
document that the quality of the accounting
information is highest when the PE investor has
a low equity stake and that the information
quality decreases when the equity stake of
the PE investor is high.
3 Our ﬁndings can be
explained from basic agency theory (e.g. Jensen
and Meckling, 1976) where high equity stakes
correspond to high levels of control, which may
substitute for the need for high quality ﬁnancial
information. PE investors with low shareholder
percentages have less contractual decision and
control rights in their portfolio companies. They
therefore have to monitor the portfolio com-
pany more closely and rely to a larger extent on
ﬁnancial accounting information, hereby essen-
tially improving the quality of the accounting
information of their portfolio companies even
more than PE investors with larger equity stakes
and with other control mechanisms at their
disposal.
We measure earnings quality in a conven-
tional way and focus on two of its vital attri-
butes: the extent of earnings management and
the timeliness of loss reporting (see e.g. Leuz
et al., 2003 or Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). We
deﬁne earnings management as the intentional
modiﬁcation of a ﬁrms performance by insiders
to either mislead stakeholders or to inﬂuence
contract terms. In general, more earnings
management is associated with lower quality
ﬁnancial information (Leuz et al., 2003). Time-
liness of loss reporting is a measure of the
conservatism of the reported earnings. Report-
ing losses in a timely manner, rather than
spreading the losses over future periods, is an
alternative indicator of earnings quality (Francis
et al., 2005).
Our ﬁndings are important as diﬀerent types
of stakeholders rely to a large extent on publicly
reported accounting information provided by
private companies. Accounting information is
important for banks in making credit decisions
and in monitoring companies. The accounting
information that Belgian SMEs have to report
publicly is commonly used by banks to assess
the ﬁnancial health of a company. It is equally
important for employees, suppliers and cus-
tomers as these stakeholders are interested in the
ﬁnancial health of the focal company and hence
in the reliability and quality of the reported
information. Further, (minority) shareholders
receive dividends based on a ﬁrms reported
proﬁtability and new vendor contracts partially
depend on a ﬁrms ﬁnancial stability. Finally,
commercial credit information companies, such
as Dun & Bradstreet (www.dnb.com) or Gray-
don (www.graydon.be), rely to a large extent on
public accounting information of SMEs to
assign their credit ratings. In summary, our
ﬁndings suggest that stakeholders, interested in
external accounting information, should take
into account the shareholder structure of the
company in order to correctly interpret the
accounting information. More precisely, exter-
nal stakeholders should not only consider PE
presence, but also their proportional share
ownership, when assessing the quality of the
reported ﬁnancial accounting information.
The remainder of this paper is as follows.
Section 2 discusses the motivation and theory
underlying the hypotheses, while section 3
describes the data collection procedure and
sample characteristics. In section 4, we extend
on the empirical models employed to study
ﬁnancial reporting quality and section 5 presents
the results. Finally, we conclude and discuss
implications for future research in section 6.
2. Theory development
The quality of publicly reported ﬁnancial infor-
mation of companies is important in our eco-
nomic society as numerous stakeholders make
decisions based on this information and there-
fore to a large extent depend on its accuracy.
Not surprisingly, a large stream of literature
examines the quality of a ﬁrms publicly reported
ﬁnancial information (e.g. Francis et al., 2005;
Leuz et al., 2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005).
Although most studies on earnings quality
focus on publicly listed companies, there is
recent evidence that the quality of reported
earnings of private companies is lower than that
of listed companies (Ball and Shivakumar,
2005). This is explained by the observation that
263 The impact of ownership concentrationprivate companies face a lower demand for
producing high quality information, as they do
not have to report to external shareholders and
are not followed by ﬁnancial analysts (Ball and
Shivakumar, 2005). However, recent evidence
suggests that PE governance positively aﬀects
accounting information production, both inter-
nally (Kaplan and Stro ¨ mberg, 2004; Davila and
Foster, 2005) and externally (Beuselinck et al.,
2004; Katz, 2006). Beuselinck et al. (2004) have
shown that the reporting quality is higher for
unlisted PE-backed companies than for compa-
rable companies that did not receive PE. Katz
(2006) ﬁnds similar results for US PE backed
unlisted ﬁrms with proportions of public debt.
This can be explained by the fact that PE
investors have strong incentives to closely
monitor the performance of their portfolio
companies in order to minimize potential moral
hazard problems between entrepreneurs and
investors (Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996;
Cornelli and Yosha, 2003). This intensive
monitoring results in a higher quality of the
publicly reported ﬁnancial information.
An unexplored but potentially important
determinant of a portfolio ﬁrms ﬁnancial
reporting quality is the proportional equity
stake that a PE investor has in that ﬁrm. Both
analytical and empirical studies suggest that the
governance and control of a portfolio company
not only depends on the contracted control and
decision rights between PE investors and the
entrepreneur, but also on the equity stake that a
PE investor holds in the venture (e.g. Aghion
and Bolton, 1992; Kaplan and Stro ¨ mberg,
2004). Hence, although enhanced monitoring by
PE investors does improve ﬁnancial reporting
quality of the portfolio ﬁrm on average
(Beuselinck et al., 2004; Katz, 2006), the
importance of the eﬀect may depend on the
equity stake of the PE investor.
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976)
provides a framework for linking the quality of
accounting information to the proportional
equity stake of PE investors. Multiple studies
show that PE investors introduce corporate
governance mechanisms to solve agency prob-
lems and to ensure that entrepreneurs act in the
common interest (e.g. Gompers and Lerner,
1999; Kaplan and Stro ¨ mberg, 2004). If a PE
company has a high proportional equity stake in
the ﬁrm, it has a determining voice in the com-
panys board and therefore is expected to have a
good insight in the real evolution and economic
performance of the ﬁrm without having to rely
on publicly reported ﬁnancial information.
4 If,
by contrast, a PE company only has a small
proportion of the total share capital, it has less
voting power and control in the ﬁrm. To the
extent that contracted decision and control
rights do not compensate this low proportional
ownership, PE investors with a low equity stake
in portfolio ﬁrms will therefore feel the need to
monitor the entrepreneurial activities more
closely since the entrepreneur has more possi-
bilities to mask the true ﬁrm performance.
This is particularly relevant given the nature
of the contracts between the PE investors and
the entrepreneurial companies. Entrepreneurs
have incentives to manipulate the short-term
performance of the venture, especially when the
venture is performing poorly, despite the nega-
tive eﬀect of these actions on the mutual trust
when detected (Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996;
Cornelli and Yosha, 2003). When predeﬁned
milestones are not met, PE investors often have
the option to acquire more control in the com-
pany (Kaplan and Stro ¨ mberg, 2004) or to
abandon the venture by denying further
ﬁnancing (Cornelli and Yosha, 2003). As a
result, the incentive of PE investors to monitor
the ﬁnancial reporting process closely is partic-
ularly high when they have a small proportional
equity stake in the venture. Since a portfolio
ﬁrms performance is reﬂected in its ﬁnancial
reporting and since this is subject to manipula-
tion when not monitored closely, PE investors
with low equity stakes have a higher incentive to
ensure that the accountability of the ﬁrms
ﬁnancial reports is high.
While PE investors especially focus on the
quality of the internally reported information
(Mitchell et al., 1995; Kaplan and Stro ¨ mberg,
2004), we argue that the improved quality of
internal information equally leads to improved
quality of externally presented accounting
information. While presenting two sets of
performance ﬁgures – one for internal use and
one for external use – is common practice in
large companies, this practice induces higher
264 C. Beuselinck and S. Manigartaccounting and audit costs which may be
excessive for small, private companies (Ball and
Shivakumar, 2005). Hence, high-quality internal
reporting ﬁgures are also expected to result in a
high quality of the publicly reported ﬁgures for
smaller, unquoted companies. As a result, we
conjecture that the higher discipline in ﬁnancial
reporting required by PE investors with low
equity stakes results in higher quality of the
publicly available ﬁnancial information. Hence:
P1: The quality of the reported earnings of a
PE backed company is inversely related to the
equity percentage a PE investor holds.
Thereare,however,argumentsthatsuggestthat
a higher PE ownership share might lead to higher
ﬁnancial reporting quality in the portfolio com-
pany. For instance, PE portfolio ﬁrms typically
have a high demand for additional external
ﬁnancing, as they are growth oriented, or are
operating with negative cash ﬂows. The initial PE
investment is often not suﬃcient to cover the
external ﬁnancing needs of most portfolio com-
panies. Therefore, after having received PE, PE
backed companies frequently issue signiﬁcant
amounts of additional equity or bank debt. When
issuing equity, they may either raise funding from
the initial PE investors or they may invite new
shareholders (Baeyens and Manigart, 2005). Re-
cent studies have shown that, in the long run,
quoted companies are able to attract more
ﬁnancing at better terms, leading to lower cost of
capitalandenhancedvalue,whenthequalityofthe
reported earnings is higher (Bharat et al., 2004;
Franciset al.,2005).Therefore,PEinvestorsmight
want to push for high quality in portfolio ﬁrms
accounting information. As a result, given that PE
investors have more inﬂuence when holding larger
equity stakes, a higher equity stake of the PE
investor could correspond to higher quality
accounting information of the portfolio company.
Another determinant potentially leading to a
positive association between PE share owner-
ship and ﬁnancial reporting quality is that PE
investors are concerned about their reputation
in the market (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).
Having a good reputation is often associated
with having higher quality deal ﬂow, increasing
the odds to be invited to syndicated deals, and
being able to raise follow-on funds at favorable
terms. The reputation of a PE investor depends
on the quality of its deals and consequently
also on the quality of its portfolio ﬁrms. As a
result, pursuing a high quality level in the
ﬁnancial reporting of portfolio ﬁrms is one
potential instrument for PE investors to signal
their good reputation. Pursuing high quality
levels in the publicly available ﬁnancial
reporting of their portfolio companies might
thus be an objective in itself. Again, since PE
investors that hold large equity stakes typically
have more inﬂuence and control in their port-
folio ﬁrms, this argument suggests a positive
association between PE share ownership and
ﬁnancial reporting quality. Consequently,
foregoing arguments lead to:
P2: The quality of the reported earnings of a
PE backed company is positively related to the
equity percentage a PE investor holds.
3. Data
The foregoing propositions are tested on a un-
ique hand-collected dataset with ﬁnancial and
non-ﬁnancial data of 270 unquoted Belgian PE
backed companies, covering the period 1985–
1999. We focus on Belgian companies, as all
Belgian companies are required by law to make
their yearly ﬁnancial statements public, enabling
us to study the relation between publicly avail-
able ﬁnancial reporting quality and PE gover-
nance in their unlisted portfolio companies.
5
Companies that received PE are identiﬁed
through annual reports of PE investors, invest-
ment reports and press releases. We exclude
ﬁnancial services companies, as their ﬁnancial
statements are diﬀerent from those of industrial
or service companies. As the accounting infor-
mation of start-ups is often incomplete, we
include only ﬁrms that were at least two years
old when they ﬁrst received PE.
6
Financial statements of the sample ﬁrms are
supplied by the National Bank of Belgium and
retrieved from Belﬁrst
, a ﬁnancial databasefrom
Bureau Van Dijk. The yearly ﬁnancial statements
fromtheinvestmentyearuptomaximally10 years
after the investment are used in the analyses. A
ﬁrmisremovedfromthedatasetfromthemoment
265 The impact of ownership concentrationthat a structural change in its legal status occurs,
which would make it impossible to interpret the
ﬁnancial statements correctly. A change may
eitherbeamergeroracquisitionwithanotherﬁrm
or a bankruptcy ﬁling. Additionally, we require
thattheﬁrmdoesnotobtainapubliclistingstatus
during our observation period as this event might
bias the quality of its ﬁnancial reporting. On
average, we have seven consecutive years of
ﬁnancialstatementsavailableforeachﬁrm,witha
minimum of three and a maximum of ten years.
This results in a total of 1,890 valid ﬁrm-year
observations from the 270 sample ﬁrms. Next to
the ﬁnancial statementinformation, we collect the
equity stake initially held by the PE investor from
investment reports and ﬁnancial statements. We
considertheequitystakeoftheleadinvestorwhen
more than one PE investor invested in the com-
pany in the initial investment round.
Table I shows the characteristics of the 270
sample ﬁrms. Panel A shows the frequency
distribution of the equity stake of the lead
investor. The average equity percentage held by
PE investors varies widely with a minimum of
5.7% and a maximum of 82.8%. PE investors
hold less than 20% of the shares in almost one in
four of the portfolio companies, less than 28%
in half of the companies, and less than 40% in
three quarters of the companies. PE investors
hold a majority stake of 50% or more in only
1.9% of the sample ﬁrms.
Panel B of Table I shows the age distribution
of the portfolio companies at the time they re-
ceived their ﬁrst PE investment, being the age
since the creation of the company. A substantial
number of ﬁrms are relatively young. 10% of the
sample ﬁrms are only two years old when they
ﬁrst received PE; about half of the sample ﬁrms
are less than ﬁve years old and about 60% are
younger than seven years when they receive their
ﬁrst PE investment. The variation in age is large,
as almost 30% of the ﬁrms in the sample are
more than 10 years old when receiving PE. This
shows that our sample spans early stage (but not
start-ups), later stage and expansion companies.
The stage of development of the company is
captured by the age variable.
With respect to industry classiﬁcation (mea-
sured by one-digit NACE classiﬁcation and re-
ported in Table I, panel C), most sample ﬁrms
are active in Manufacturing and Electronic
Devices (21%), in Business Services (17%) and
in Distribution, Trade and Retail (17%).
For the purpose of our analyses, we split the
sample into companies in which the PE investor
holds relatively low equity stakes (deﬁned as less
TABLE I
Characteristics of sample companies (N = 270)
Panel A: Frequencies of ownership percentage of the lead
PE investor













> 60% 0.7 100.0
Maximum = 82.8
Panel B: Age of the portfolio company at initial PE
investment











More than 10 29.2 100.0
Panel C: Industry concentration of portfolio companies









Note: Panel A of Table 1 reports frequencies of ownership
percentages of the lead PE investor, obtained at the initial
PE ﬁnancing round. Panel B reports distributional prop-
erties of the age of all sample ﬁrms at the moment of the
initial PE ﬁnancing date. Panel C lists the top 3 sectors
represented in our sample PE backed ﬁrms.
266 C. Beuselinck and S. Manigartthan 40%) and those in which the PE investor
holds relatively high equity stakes (more than
40%). This corresponds to comparing the subset
of ﬁrms in the highest PE ownership quartile to
all other PE backed ﬁrms and results in 1,435
(75%) company-years withlowequity stakesand
455 (25%) company-years with high equity
stakes. We did sensitivity analyses with other
cut-oﬀ values for low and high equity stakes,
which did not alter the results. The dummy
variable Highperc takes a value of 1 if the PE
investorholdsmorethan40%ofthesharesand0
if the investor holds less than 40% of the shares.
Table II shows the variables used in the mul-
tivariate analyses, for both groups of low equity
percentage and high equity percentage ﬁrms.
Firms in which PE investors have a high own-
ership percentage are signiﬁcantly smaller (with
size measured as total assets) than low equity
percentage ﬁrms, both with respect to mean and
median values. This suggests that PE investors
hold highest proportional equity ownership
stakes in smaller ﬁrms in our sample. Low equity
percentage ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly older (mean of
14.8 years) than high equity percentage ﬁrms
(mean of 13.4 years), although the diﬀerence is
not substantial in real terms. The other variables
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the two
subsets of ﬁrms: EBIT, cash ﬂow, change in
proﬁts before and after taxes and accounting
accruals are comparable for low equity percent-
age and high equity percentage ﬁrms.
4. Method of analysis
Using correctly deﬁned proxies for accounting
quality is essential. We measure earnings quality
through two of its vital attributes that are
commonly used in ﬁnancial accounting research:
the extent of earnings management and the
timeliness of loss reporting (e.g. Leuz et al.,
2003; Francis et al., 2005; Ball and Shivakumar,
2005). In this section, we brieﬂy explain the
characteristics and interpretation of these
measures.
4.1. Tests of earnings management
Consistent with earlier research, we deﬁne
earnings management as the intentional modi-
ﬁcation of a ﬁrms performance by insiders to
either mislead stakeholders or to inﬂuence con-
tract terms. Mainstream accounting research
measures the extent of earnings management
through the accruals components in a com-
panys ﬁnancial statements. Accruals are
accounting elements that distinguish a ﬁrms
cash ﬂow from operations from its reported
earnings. Part of these accruals follow inherently
from the growth of business activities, but
managers have some ﬂexibility in reporting
accruals so as to inﬂuence the bottom line re-
ported earnings (Leuz et al., 2003). Accounting
research generally considers accruals related to
working capital and depreciation policy. By






The basic role of accruals is to construct an
earnings measure that is less noisy over time than
the realized cash ﬂow is. As a result, earnings
ﬁgures should be more closely related to the real
underlying ﬁrm performance than cash ﬂow ﬁg-
ures are (Dechow, 1994; Ball and Shivakumar,
2005). Hence, it is clear that accruals and cash
ﬂow are both contemporaneously and serially
negatively correlated over time. However, larger
magnitudes of this correlation do not necessarily
reﬂect a ﬁrms underlying economic performance
and are considered to be a signal of earnings
management (Leuz et al., 2003). We therefore
test the intrinsic relation between accruals and
cash ﬂow and diﬀerentiate our analyses for high
versus low equity ownership percentages. This
results in the following model:
ACCi;t ¼ai;t þ b1OCFi;t þ b2Highperci
þ b3Highperci   OCFi;t
þ b4 logðTotal AssetsÞi;t
þ b5 logðAgeÞi;t þ H
0INDi þ ei;t ð2Þ
with i = a ﬁrm indicator and t = a time indi-
cator, Acc = total accruals, deﬁned as above,




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































268 C. Beuselinck and S. ManigartHighperc (dummy variable) = 1 if PE investors
have equity stake higher than cut-oﬀ level, 0
otherwise, OCF = operational cash ﬂow,
ln(TotalAssets) = natural logarithm of total
assets, ln(Age) = natural logarithm of the ﬁrms
age, IND = industry dummies (one-digit sector
codes).
Because of the intrinsic negative relation
between total accounting accruals and opera-
tional cash ﬂow, we expect b1 to be negative.
Next to the OCF variable, we include the
Highperc dummy (coeﬃcient b2) and the
interaction between the Highperc dummy and
OCF (coeﬃcient b3). A signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for
b3 indicates that there is a diﬀerence in the
earnings management behavior of high and low
equity ownership ﬁrms. A signiﬁcantly negative
coeﬃcient of the interaction term b2 supports
Proposition 1 (i.e. ﬁrms in which PE investors
have a high equity stake report lower quality
ﬁnancial reporting compared to low equity
ﬁrms). By contrast, a signiﬁcantly positive coef-
ﬁcient would provide support for the alternative
Proposition 2 that high PE equity stakes corre-
spond with higher quality ﬁnancial reporting.
Total assets and age are included as control
variables, as the bivariate analyses have shown
that companies in which PE investors have a
high equity stake are typically smaller and
younger. Finally, IND controls for industry
ﬁxed eﬀects (measured as one-digit sector
codes).
4.2. Tests of timely loss recognition
The second proxy for earnings quality, namely
the timeliness of loss reporting, is a measure of
the conservatism of the reported earnings.
Reporting losses in a timely manner, rather than
spreading the losses over future periods, leads to
more conservative earnings (Ball and Shivaku-
mar, 2005). It is an indicator of earnings quality,
since conservative ﬁnancial statements are more
reliable for creditors, shareholders, managers
and other external parties to assess the proper
value of the company (Watts, 2003). Following
the Ball and Shivakumar model (2005), earnings
are of a higher quality if bad news is reported as
a transitory shock (i.e. a one-time dip) in current
earnings. We measure timely loss reporting in
accounting income by focusing on the tendency
for income decreases to reverse. If prior-period
earnings decreases show a higher tendency to
reverse than prior-period earnings increases, this
is evidence of a higher willingness to recognize
losses timely and corresponds to higher earn-
ings conservatism. Transitory gain and loss
components are estimated as follows (Ball and
Shivakumar, 2005):
DNIt ¼b0 þ b1NEGðDNIÞt 1 þ b2DNIt 1
þ b3NEGðDNIÞt 1   DNIt 1 þ et; ð3Þ
with: DNIt = income change at time t, scaled by
beginning-of-the-year book value of total assets,
DNIt)1 = income change at time t)1, scaled by
beginning-of-the-year book value of total assets,
NEG(DNI)t)1 = dummy variable taking the
value of 1 when prior-period earnings changes
are negative.
By making the estimation model dependent
on prior period earnings decreases, we are able
to study the reversion tendency of losses and
gains separately. If losses are recognized in a
timely manner, then the coeﬃcient (b2 + b3)
will be negative. Further, losses are recognized
in a more timely way than gains if b3 <0 .
To test the relationship between the equity
percentage of the PE investor and timely loss
recognition, we supplement model (3) with the
Highperc (here denoted as: HEP) dummy. This
results in the model (4):
DNIt ¼a0 þ b1NEGðDNIÞt 1 þ b2DNIt 1
þ b3NEGðDNIÞt 1   DNIt 1
þ b4HEP þ b5HEP   NEGðDNIÞt 1
þ b6HEP   DNIt 1 þ b7HEP
  NEGðDNIÞt 1   DNIt 1 þ et ð4Þ
with: DNIt = income level change at time t,
scaled by beginning-of-the-year total assets,
DNIt)1 = income level change at time t)1,
scaled by beginning-of-the-year total assets,
NEG(DNI)t)1 = dummy for prior-period neg-
ative income level change, HEP = dummy
variable = 1 if PE investors have equity stake
higher than cut-oﬀ level, 0 otherwise.
We are interested in diﬀerences in timely loss
reporting between companies in which PE
269 The impact of ownership concentrationinvestors hold high equity percentages and those
in which PE investors hold low equity stakes.
Therefore, our discussion will primarily focus on
(b6 + b7) as this measures the compound eﬀect
for diﬀerences in timely loss reporting between
both subsamples. If (b6 + b7)>0, then Highp-
erc companies recognize losses less timely
compared to ﬁrms where PE ownership shares
are lower, and vice versa. Hence, ﬁnding a
signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient for (b6 + b7)
suggests lower accounting quality in Highperc
ﬁrms and supports Proposition 1. By contrast,
observing a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient is
consistent with Proposition 2.
7
5. Multivariate ﬁndings
Table III reports the accruals – cash ﬂow mod-
els. Regression (1) models the accruals as a
function of the operational cash ﬂow and the
size and age control variables. In regression (2),
we condition for high versus low equity per-
centage ﬁrms, without taking the control vari-
ables into account. Regression (3) is the full
model and is similar to regression (2) but addi-
tionally incorporates the control variables for
size and age. All models are highly signiﬁcant.
Table III conﬁrms that accounting accruals
and cash ﬂows are negatively correlated. This is
consistent with general ﬁndings in the account-
ing literature (e.g. Dechow, 1994; Ball and
Shivakumar, 2005). The coeﬃcient of the inter-
action term Highperc OCF (b3), which is the
coeﬃcient of interest for our propositions, is
signiﬁcant and negative in all regressions.
8 This
supports Proposition 1: accruals of companies in
which PE investors hold large equity stakes are
more negatively related to the operational cash
ﬂows than those of companies in which PE
investors hold small equity stakes. In other
words: accounting quality, measured by its
earnings management component, is lower in
ﬁrms where PE investors hold high equity stakes
compared to those where PE investors hold low
equity stakes. Further, the coeﬃcients of the
control variables (age and size) are signiﬁcant
and positive.
Table IV reports the timeliness of loss
reporting models. We focus on proﬁt before
taxes (regressions (1) and (2)) and proﬁt after
taxes (regressions (3) and (4)).
9 The ﬁrst and
third columns show the estimation results of the
base model (3), while the second and fourth
columns show the estimation results of the full
model (4) including the Highperc variables. All
models are signiﬁcant; adding the Highperc
variables improves the ﬁt of the models.
The coeﬃcient of D(DNI)t)1   DNIt)1 (b3)i s
signiﬁcant and negative in Regressions (1) and
(3). This indicates that losses are recognized
more timely than gains by all ﬁrms in the sam-
ple. Further, (b2 + b3) is signiﬁcant and nega-
tive in Regressions (1) and (3), strengthening the
ﬁnding of timely recognition of losses. When
adding the Highperc dummy variable and
interaction terms in Regressions (2) and (4), b7 is
signiﬁcantly positive. This implies that high
equity percentage companies recognize losses
less timely than gains, compared to low equity
percentage companies. Moreover, (b6 + b7)i s
signiﬁcantly positive, suggesting that Highperc
ﬁrms report losses less timely compared to other
PE backed ﬁrms. Results hold and are signiﬁcant
for both proﬁt before and after taxes: (b6 + b7)
equals 0.055 (t = 1.98) for proﬁt before taxes
and 0.093 (t = 2.23) for proﬁt after taxes.
10
Hence, the results with respect to the timeli-
ness of loss recognition also provide support for
Proposition 1: companies in which PE investors
hold a large equity stake recognize losses less
timely than those in which PE investors hold a
small equity stake. Recognizing losses in a less
timely fashion corresponds to a lower quality
and reliability of ﬁnancial reporting. In sum-
mary, both attributes of earnings quality,
namely the extent of earnings management and
the timeliness of loss reporting, yield consistent
results and both support Proposition 1.
6. Conclusion and discussion
The governance and shareholder structure of an
unquoted company determines how that com-
pany functions (Cowling, 2003). We have pro-
vided evidence on how PE shareholders
inﬂuence one aspect of the professionalization of
a company, namely the quality of its ﬁnancial
accounts provided to the public community.
While previous research has shown that the
quality of the ﬁnancial accounts of an unquoted
270 C. Beuselinck and S. Manigartcompany signiﬁcantly improves when a PE
investor becomes a shareholder, our study pro-
vides evidence that the equity percentage held by
the PE investor has a moderating impact on the
quality of the ﬁnancial accounts. The quality of
publicly available ﬁnancial information is lower
when the PE investor holds a large equity stake,
while it is higher when the PE investor holds a
small equity stake.
We interpret this as evidence that the quality
of the ﬁnancial accounts of an unquoted com-
pany and the proportional equity stake of
external PE investors are substitutes rather than
complements. Our ﬁndings are explained from
basic agency theory and the importance of
ﬁnancial reporting in monitoring entrepre-
neurial actions. In portfolio ﬁrms where PE
investors have only low proportional equity
stakes, their decision power and insight in the
true performance of the ﬁrm is low compared to
the situation where PE investors have large
proportional equity stakes. Since entrepreneurs
have an incentive to manage the performance of
the venture (Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996;
Cornelli and Yosha, 2003) and that this is re-
ﬂected in ﬁnancial reporting, PE investors with
low share ownerships know the danger of un-
monitored ﬁnancial reporting and react by
strongly disciplining the ﬁnancial reporting and
internal accounting control system. To the
extent that publicly reported information is in
line with internal reporting, this results in better
external ﬁnancial reporting quality for portfolio
ﬁrms in which PE investors have low equity
stakes, and vice versa.
This ﬁnding is important for external stake-
holders for whom ﬁnancial accounts of compa-
nies yield important input for their decision-
making process. These include banks, suppliers,
customers, employees and credit rating agencies,
but also prospective later-round equity investors
or acquirers. These parties all should realize that
the quality of the reported ﬁnancial performance
is not to be taken at face value. Although the
quality of the accounting ﬁgures of PE backed
companies is, in general, better than that of
comparable companies that are not backed by
PE investors (Beuselinck et al., 2004; Katz,
2006), the equity percentage held by the lead PE
investor is an additional important determinant
of this relationship. This suggests that diﬀer-
ences in proportional ownership concentration
correspond to dissimilar governance focus with
respect to monitoring of ﬁnancial reporting, and
TABLE III
Multivariate OLS regressions : accruals – cash ﬂow relation









Highperc / 0.001 (0.92) 0.007 (1.04)




** (3.06) / 0.005
*** (3.02)
Log(Age) 0.019
*** (5.32) / 0.019
*** (5.36)
Sector dummies Included Included Included
Adjusted R
2 0.506 0.493 0.508
F-statistic 174.67 166.17 148.77
Sample size 1,890 1,890 1,890
Note: Table III reports regression results of operating cash ﬂow on accruals levels across all sample ﬁrm-years. Highperc is a
dummy variable equal to one if the PE investor owns more than the predeﬁned cut-oﬀ point (40%) of the outstanding share
capital. (Highperc OCF) is the interaction variable of the Highperc dummy and the operating cash ﬂow and measures the
incremental association between accruals and cash ﬂows for ﬁrms with high PE investor ownership stakes. Regression (1) tests
for the relation between accruals and operating cash ﬂow (OCF) without conditioning the sample for high and low equity
percentage ﬁrms. Regression (2) tests for diﬀerences in the accruals – cash ﬂow relation between high and low equity
percentage ﬁrms and Regression (3) additionally controls for Size and Age. Results are consistent (but not reported for
the sake of brevity) for sensitivity adjustments in the choice of the cut-oﬀ point for high versus low equity percentages.
*** statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level,
** at the 5% level and
* at the 10% level.
271 The impact of ownership concentrationin turn aﬀects the publicly observed ﬁnancial
reporting quality.
Our study has some limitations. First, we
focus on the reporting quality of Belgian PE
backed companies. Belgium has a bank-centered
ﬁnancial system; therefore, the results may not
be transferable to economies with a more equity-
centered ﬁnancial system such as the UK or the
US (Black and Gilson, 1998). However, we
chose the Belgian context as it is one of the
rare settings where accounting information of
unquoted companies is publicly available for a
large set of unlisted ﬁrms. Because of the lack of
data on private ﬁrms in an international setting,
these ﬁrms have typically been neglected in the
international accounting literature. A disad-
vantage of our dataset, however, is the lack of
speciﬁc data like board composition or voting
rights, preventing us from undertaking more
ﬁne-grained analyses. Second, we treated all PE
investors equally and only distinguished them
with respect to their equity stake. However,
recent research emphasizes that not all PE is the
same. The impact of a PE investor may depend
on its experience or portfolio strategy. Further,
Leleux and Surlemont (2003) suggest that
diﬀerent types of PE investors typically have
diﬀerent investment horizons, investment goals
and incentives, which potentially aﬀect their
involvement in their portfolio ﬁrms. Bank-re-
lated and government-related PE ﬁrms are more
prominent in Belgium than in other European
countries. These two types of investors are
typically assumed to be less actively involved
with their portfolio companies (Leleux and
Surlemont, 2003). The fact that we nevertheless
ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects, despite their potentially
lower involvement on average, enhances the
strength of the ﬁndings. Due to data limitations,
we were not able to take diﬀerences between
types of PE investors into account and leave this
for future research.
TABLE IV
Multivariate OLS regressions: timeliness of loss reporting
Dependent variable:D(Net income) Net income level = Proﬁt before
taxes
Net income level = Proﬁt after taxes
Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3) Regression (4)
Intercept 0.022 (0.48) 0.021 (0.44) 0.027 (0.60) 0.028 (0.59)
D(DNI)t)1 (b1) )0.011 (-1.46) )0.007 (-0.84) )0.012 (-1.67) )0.009 (-1.16)
DNIt)1 (b2) )0.063
** (-2.31) )0.023 (-0.73) )0.064
** (-2.41) )0.023 (-0.75)





Highperc. (b4) / 0.016 (1.35) / 0.013 (1.13)
Highperc. x D(DNI)t)1 (b5)/ )0.015 (-0.91) / )0.010 (-0.61)
Highperc. DNIt)1 (b6)/ )0.173
*** (-2.76) / )0.174
*** (-2.86)
Highperc. x D(DNI)t)1 x DNIt)1 (b7) / 0.228
* (1.77) / 0.267
* (2.12)
Log(Total assets) (b8) )0.003 (-0.09) )0.002 (-1.29) )0.003 (-1.38) )0.003 (-1.29)
Log(Age) (b9) 0.007 (1.50) 0.007 (1.52) 0.007 (1.54) 0.007 (1.53)
Sector dummies Included Included Included Included
Adjusted R
2 0.097 0.107 0.109 0.111
F-statistic 16.65 13.22 18.77 14.92
Sample size 1,890 1,890 1,890 1,890
Note: Table IV presents regression results on the timeliness of loss reporting. Regression (1) and (2) relate to proﬁt before taxes
as dependent variable while Regression (3) and (4) relate to proﬁt after taxes. Estimates of the base model (3) are reported in
column 1 and 3, while estimates of the full model (4) are reported in column 2 and 4. With respect to the variable names,
D(DNI)t)1 is a dummy variable equal to one if the preceding years net income change is negative. DNIt)1 is the change in
preceding years net income and D(DNI)t)1   DNIt)1 is the interaction eﬀect between both. Highperc is a dummy variable,
taking the value of one if the PE investor owns more than the predeﬁned cut-oﬀ point (40%) of the outstanding share capital.
Higperc is interacted with each of the previously described variables, both separately and combined, to disentangle the
timeliness of loss reporting for ﬁrms with high versus low equity stakes and with positive versus negative earnings changes in
preceding years.
*** statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level,
** at the 5% level and
* at the 10% level.
272 C. Beuselinck and S. ManigartYet another route for further research is to
distinguish between various types of shareholders
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003) in studying the
associated eﬀect on the quality of accounting
information. In the present study, we only
investigated the impact of a speciﬁc ownership
type (PE investors) on the quality of accounting
information, without taking other types of
shareholders into account. In most ﬁrms in our
sample, the entrepreneurs were the only other
type of shareholders, next to the PE investors.
Some ﬁrms have other shareholders, however,
that may also impact the quality of the
accounting information of the portfolio ﬁrm.
Distinguishing between having business angels
or corporate investors as shareholders compared
to PE investors may further enhance our
understanding of monitoring eﬀorts of diﬀerent
types of shareholders and their eﬀects on the
portfolio company. Further along this route, it
might also be interesting to distinguish between
ﬁrst, second or third generation family ﬁrms and
see how transitions between generations might
impact accounting information.
Finally, a more direct measurement of the
monitoring eﬀort of PE ﬁrms and its impact on
the reporting quality of their portfolio compa-
nies might yield additional insights. We only
studied one of the outcomes of their monitoring
eﬀorts, namely the quality of ﬁnancial accounts.
It may well be, however, that the monitoring
eﬀorts of the PE investors have additional
positive outcomes. Future studies could examine
the direct impact of speciﬁc PE corporate
governance structures and monitoring actions
on the professionalization of internal accounting
and control systems in portfolio companies.
Notes
1 We deﬁne ‘‘private equity’’ as the provision of (quasi)
equity to unquoted companies by professional intermedi-
aries. Venture capital provided to early stage companies is
thus a subset of private equity as deﬁned here.
2 In Belgium – the institutional setting of this study –
both private as well as publicly listed ﬁrms have a legal
obligation to publicly report their yearly ﬁnancial state-
ments. In the US, by contrast, ﬁnancial reporting require-
ments depend solely on a ﬁrms listing status. The
availability of ﬁnancial statement data of private ﬁrms
provides the opportunity to study ﬁnancial reporting
characteristics of PE backed ﬁrms even before they are
publicly listed. More details on the institutional setting and
ﬁnancial reporting requirements are provided in Section 3
on data description and sample composition.
3 In a related paper (Beuselinck et al., 2004), we show
(amongst others) that the quality of the accounting infor-
mation of PE backed companies is higher than that of non-
PE backed companies, irrespective of the equity stake of the
PE investor. Hence, the quality of the accounting infor-
mation of PE backed companies where the investors hold
large equity stakes is still higher on average than that of non
PE backed companies.
4 Note that because of the private character of our
sample ﬁrms, we do not have information on the board
composition nor on voting power rights in our sample
ﬁrms. We hence assume that equity ownership captures this
information suﬃciently well.
5 Hellmann and Puri (2002) document that the eﬀect that
PE investors have on their portfolio companies is strongest
when ﬁrms are not publicly listed. This dataset provides an
excellent opportunity to analyze the under-explored impact
that PE governance has on the ﬁnancial reporting behavior
of their unlisted portfolio ﬁrms. Moreover, this dataset
suﬀers less from survivorship bias than US studies on pre-
IPO PE backed ﬁrms.
6 Note that our results are unaﬀected when we include
only ﬁrms that are more than three or ﬁve years old.
However, restricting the ﬁrms age too much substantially
reduces the number of testable observations. As a result, we
decide to incorporate as much information as possible in
our study by setting the minimum age equal to two years.
7 Remark that, if b7 > 0 (resp.<0), then Highperc ﬁrms
recognize losses less timely (resp. more timely) than gains,
compared to ﬁrms in which PE investors hold low equity
stakes.
8 To the extent that proportional equity ownership is an
entrepreneurial choice, this potentially raises the concern of
endogeneity bias in our results. To overcome problems of
endogeneity, we estimated PE equity ownership (High–
Low) choice simultaneously with the accruals regressions.
In unreported tests, we ran two-stage Heckman regressions
including the natural logarithm of total assets, the year-on-
year growth in total assets, the long-term leverage, the
quick ratio and return on assets as explanatory variables in
the ﬁrst stage (selection model). Results of the second stage
regressions then incorporate the initial regression variables
plus the coeﬃcient on the inverse Mills ratio (IMR).
Although coeﬃcients on the IMR are signiﬁcant, the coef-
ﬁcients of interest remain stable comforting the idea that
endogeneity bias, if present in any form, is not distorting
our results and interpretations.
9 Note that Belgian ﬁnancial reports are used as input for
calculating tax ﬁgures too. Taxable income is computed
from ﬁnancial reports taking a number of speciﬁc
adjustments into account (e.g. depreciation adjustments,
carry-forward of losses, dividend adjustments, exclusion of
speciﬁc costs). Because of this link between tax and ﬁnancial
accounting, we study both pre-tax and after tax income
levels, as it is unclear what the potential confounding eﬀect
of taxes is on the measures for timeliness of loss reporting.
273 The impact of ownership concentrationMoreover, the distinction between pre-tax and after tax
income is potentially important for ﬁrm-years where
deferred taxes result in negative proﬁts after taxes while
pre-tax proﬁts are positive.
10 Consistent with the potential concern of endogeneity
bias in our ﬁndings, we ran two-stage Heckman tests in the
same form as in the accruals regressions, yielding similar
results as in the tests reported above.
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